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Abstract
Karl Pearson is the leading figure of XX century statistics. He and
his co-workers crafted the core of the theory, methods and language of
frequentist or classical statistics – the prevalent inductive logic of con-
temporary science. However, before working in statistics, K.Pearson had
other interests in life, namely, in this order, philosophy, physics, and bi-
ological heredity. Key concepts of his philosophical and epistemological
system of anti-Spinozism (a form of transcendental idealism) are carried
over to his subsequent works on the logic of scientific discovery.
This article’s main goal is to analyze K.Pearson early philosophical
and theological ideas and to investigate how the same ideas came to in-
fluence contemporary science, either directly or indirectly – by the use
of variant theories, methods and dialects of statistics, corresponding to
variant statistical inference procedures and their specific belief calculi.
Keywords: Causality and natural laws, Inductive logic and probabilistic in-
ference, Phenomenology, Logical Positivism, Karl Pearson, Baruch Spinoza.
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010): 01-02; 03-03, 62-03.
Scientific research can reduce superstition by encouraging people to
think and view things in terms of cause and effect. Certain it is that a
conviction, akin to religious feeling, of the rationality and intelligibility
of the world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order. This firm
belief, a belief bound up with a deep feeling, in a superior mind that
reveals itself in world of experience, represents my conception of God.
In common parlance this may be described as “pantheistic” (Spinoza).
Albert Eistein, Ideas And Opinions, (1988, p.46, 262).
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!הָלַכּ תא¯רְקִל י£דוֹד הÈְל
!הָלַכּ לַע Nָתָח שׂוּשְׂמִכּ ¢יָה·לֱא ¢יַלָע שׂי¤שׂ³י
!הָלִחְתּ הָבµשֲׁחַמְבּ ה¬שֲׂעַמ Pוֹס הÈוּסנ M«דֶקִמ שׁא¸רֵמ
Let’s go, beloved, let’s meet the bride:
Your God will rejoice over you, As the groom rejoices over his bride;
Before the beginning she was offered, Planned from start, Created at end.
XVI century verses by Rabbi Shlomo Halevi Alkabetz
1 Introduction
Karl Pearson (1857-1936) is the leading figure of XX century statistics. Un-
der his direct tutelage or influence, George Udny Yule (1871-1951), Ronald A.
Fisher (1890-1962), Jerzy Neyman (1894-1981), Egon S. Pearson (1895-1980),
and many others defined the methods, language and epistemology of the fre-
quentist school of mathematical statistics, that is, of XX century mainstream
statistics – the prevalent belief calculus used for inductive reasoning in the
practice of contemporary science. This formalism translates K.Pearson’s epis-
temological and philosophical position on the logic of scientific discovery, a
position he calls: “Inverted-Spinozism – a Spinozism modified by Fichte”.
Today, K.Pearson is known for his work in Statistics. However, his in-
tellectual journey has many roots. Before working in Statistics, he studied
and worked in philosophy, theology, physics, heredity and eugenics. More-
over, his work in these fields had a compelling influence in his later work
in statistics. Nowadays, many didactic text-books present K.Pearson’s philo-
sophical positions very unfaithfully, in watered-down pseudo-positivist or in
sterilized decision-theoretic versions. Like the roots of a tall tree, the origins of
K.Pearson’s philosophy are now deeply buried and often concealed, Neverthe-
less, like the branches of the same three, its epistemological and methodological
consequences are clearly seen and its influence strongly felt all over the realm of
contemporary statistical science. Moreover, since statistical test of hypotheses
became the de facto standard for validating scientific research, this influence
is exerted much further. In this and following articles we analyze the histori-
cal and conceptual development of K.Pearson philosophy, and consider how it
has influenced statistical inference procedures and the logic of corresponding
belief-calculi.
The main goal of this paper is to present Pearson’s epistemological views,
as he presented them in academic articles and books, and also as presented
allegorically in his novel The New Werther. Section 2 presents my interpreta-
tion of K.Pearson’s mystical journey of “Renouncing the bride”, as narrated in
The New Werther. Section 3 details more technical aspects of his philosophical
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concept of Inverted-Spinozism. Sections 4 and 5 are conceived as a bridge, of-
fering a connection to K.Pearson ideas concerning ether physics, heredity and
eugenics, examining how these ideas were strongly influenced by his previous
work in philosophy, and how they directly influenced his later work in statis-
tics. Following articles will discuss in detail the concepts of direct vs. inverse
probabilities, analyzing its historical roots, K.Pearson’s ideas on this topic,
and their profound influence in XX century mathematical statistics. Section
6 presents some final remarks, including other directions for future research,
some conclusions and acknowledgments.
2 Sophia, Maimonides, Spinoza, Fichte, and Locki
K.Pearson arrives at his philosophical concept of Inverted-Spinozism after a
religious and spiritual crisis, and presents his positions in several forms, includ-
ing: His influential book The Grammar of Science (1892); some review articles
about the philosophy of Spinoza (1880, 1883) and, most importantly in our
context; his novel The New Werther – by Locki (1880). This novel presents
his philosophy in a romantic and mystical context, that we explore in Section
2.2 via Spinoza’s philosophical roots in Jewish philosophical and mystical writ-
ings by Moshe ben Maimon (1135-1204), Abraham Abulafia (1240-1291) and
Joseph Gikatilla (1248-1310). Section 2.3 presents some of the motivations and
some epistemological consequences of K.Pearson’s Inverted-Spinozism.
2.1 Love and Sex (or lack thereof) in The New Werther
K.Pearson describes the style of The New Werther as schwa¨rmerisch roman-
ticism, using the term Schwa¨rmerei in the sense of enthusiastic fervor. In
German, this term usually means rapture or infatuation, and it is also used
in religious literature to denote zealotry, in the sense of utmost commitment
to ethical values and self-renunciation, see Levine (2010). In the next subsec-
tions, I present a philosophical and mystical interpretation of this outstanding
and unusual work, that I see as an act of true philosophical and spiritual re-
nunciation, namely, Renouncing the Bride, as explained in the sequel. I also
explain why I see The New Werther as the point of departure and the fulcrum
for all of K.Pearson latter works in science and statistics. Nevertheless, the
reader should be aware that my interpretation differs from existing ones, spe-
cially from that of K.Pearson’s main biographer, Theodore Porter (2004, Ch.3,
p.43-68).
The New Werther describes the journey of Arthur, a young Englishmen
in Germany, his adventures visiting Heidelberg university, and his wandering
about the scenic routes of the Black Forest. The novel’s full title, The New
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Werther – by Locki, reveals its fictional author, Locki – named after the shape
shifter, trickster and subversive Germanic god – that plays the role of a Faustian
Mephistopheles, the scatterer and forgerer of lies, !רֶקµשׁ לֶפֹתּ Zִפֵמ, as in Job 13:4.
This epistolary novel involves three main characters: Arthur; Ethel, Arthur’s
fiance; and Raphael, Arthur’s friend at the university.
Arthur unequivocally represents K.Pearson himself. According to Porter
(2004, p.54-55) well documented interpretation, Raphael is a fictional charac-
ter partially based on Raphael Wertheimer, K.Pearson’s friend and Law stu-
dent at Heidelberg. Furthermore, Porter (2004, p.55-56) concludes that “the
role of Ethel was an elaboration of Pearson’s friendship with Robert Parker”,
K.Pearson’s study partner and colleague at Cambridge. Furthermore Porter
considers their relationship suggestive of the “upper-class male relationships
at school in the Victorian era, and the efflorescence of homosexual activity at
King’s College”, pondering however that “there is no evidence to support, and
much reason to doubt, that this friendship was ever explicitly sexual”.
In the next subsections I offer an alternative reading of The New Werther,
including an alternative interpretation of the characters Ethel and Raphael. I
do not deny the validity of Porter’s interpretation, not least because I do not
have access to K.Pearson correspondence and other sources used by Porter in
his biographical studies. Moreover, I do not consider these interpretations to
be mutually exclusive. Perhaps, all sexual tensions so accurately alluded by
Porter could be considered as earthly affairs contrasting, and in this way com-
plementing and highlighting, the spiritual and philosophical concerns discussed
in the next subsections. After all, in the human soul (ψυχη, Psyche), several
aspects of sex, love and thought and their representations appear to be deeply
intertwined, as suggested by the ancient Greek myths of ρoς, Eros, in his two
forms: either the playful young god of love, or his older form, φανης – Phanes,
the shiny god of revelation. Hence, it should not be surprising to see all these
aspects emerge together in the turmoil of K.Pearson’s religious and spiritual
crisis.
2.2 Spinoza’s Epistemological Principles and its Precursors
The New Werther presents K.Pearson’s doctrine of Inverted-Spinozism in the
aforementioned schwa¨rmerisch-romantic style, and is permeated by mystical
elements. As an example, let us quote from the first encounter of Arthur and
Raphael:
I was in the library, looking for a copy of Maimonides, to whom my study
of Spinoza had led me, when I found a queer-looking person busily reading
in a corner the very book I wanted. He had a distinctly Jewish face, and yet
beneath his raven-black and straggling locks there was an apostolic nobility
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and depth. He seemed to know by inspiration what I had come for, and
with a salutation offered me the book. Pearson (NW, p.22).
K.Pearson structures his philosophical doctrine of inverted-Sponizism around
(and against) three major principles of Spinozian philosophy and epistemology,
namely:
(1) Deus sive natura;
(2) Cognitione causae and Leges naturae universales;
(3) Amor Dei intellectualis.
These epistemological principles are presented in axiomatic form at Baruch
Spinoza’s magnum opus, namely, his Ethica – Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata
of 1677. K.Pearson had great familiarity, and also strong opinions about
Spinoza’s works and his commentators, even publishing in 1880 a review of
Pollock’s Spinoza at the Cambridge Review. K.Pearson was also well aware of
precursors of these epistemological principles rooted in medieval Jewish philos-
ophy, as clearly attested by his article Maimonides and Spinoza published at
Mind in 1883. As examined in this section, these medieval philosophical pre-
cursors are expressed in a language and permeated by forms of argumentation
that are perceived by contemporary readers as essentially mystical in nature,
for further comments see Stern (2017) and also Fraenkel (2006), Harvey (2007)
and Idel (2000).
In our context, the mystical route to Spinoza’s epistemological principles of-
fers some advantages over the axiomatic (ordine geometrico) exposition, among
others: (a) It is in the best spirit of The New Werther, a main object of study
in this article; (b) It offers efficient short-cuts, allowing for close and effective
connections with and between topics concerning causal analysis in natural sci-
ence to be studied in the next sections. Having the aforementioned objectives
and justifications in mind, let us explore Spinoza’s epistemological principles
via the Maimon-to-Spinoza mystic route.
Deus sive natura
Spinoza’s principle of Deus sive natura – God, or equivalently, nature – finds a
precursor in Moshe ben Maimon (1135-1204) classical formula: ha-pe (ulot ha-
)elohiyoth, ha-pe (ulot ha-teb (ayoth, !תוֹיעַבֶטַה תוֹלuעְפַה תוֹיִה·לְֶאַה תוֹלuעְפַה ; meaning:
In the world we live in – Actions of God (are just) actions of nature.
Abraham Gikatilla (1248-1310) explains Maimonides’ formula using forms
of sylleptic argumentation that are typical of Jewish medieval philosophy and
mysticism, see Stern (2017). His argument is based on the careful examination
of the !שׁ«רֹשׁ, shoresh, root or stem !עבט. On one hand, this stem generates
the word !עַבֶט, teba, a substantive meaning nature or substance; On the other
hand, this stem generates the word !עַבַט, tab (a, a verb meaning sank, stamped,
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coined or formulated; including the derived form !ַעֵבְּטַמ, matbe ( a, coin, type,
formula. Also of interest is the expression !N¢יַעÊתוּעיִבְט, tebiyoth– (ayn, meaning
intuition or insight, literally, eye-impression; see Klein (1987, p.239-240, 337.
Gikatilla conclusion from this philological analysis is that “things”, as they
present themselves in nature, are coined, patterned, and also behave according
to ideal types or abstract formulas, types and formulas that convey the will of
God.
Interestingly, the Latin words causare, causa, (to) cause; are etymologically
related to cudere, cusum, (to) strike, hammer, forge, stamp, coin; suggesting
an analogy that parallels Maimonides formulation and its later interpretation
by Gikatilla. The same analogy is repeated in the Portuguese (the language
of Spinoza’s country of origin) words causa/ cousa, the cause (of something)/
(some)thing (caused).
Cognitione causae and Leges naturae universales
The preceding analysis of Spinoza’s first epistemological principle, Deus sive
natura, brings us directly to his second principle – The understanding of causes
and universal natural laws. In the next paragraphs we reproduce this principle
in abridged form, for the full version see Ethics (1677, Part I, Axiom 4; Pref.
for Part III & IV).
So, the cause or reason why God, or nature, acts, and the cause or reason
why He exists, are therefore one and the same. ... The eternal and infinite
Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that
whereby it exists. ... The knowledge of an effect involves and depends on
the knowledge of its cause. ... and therefore, one and the same should be
the method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,
through nature’s universal laws and rules.1
Amor Dei intellectualis
Once the first and second principles are stated and accepted, one question
presents itself: Can mankind, even if in approximate form, have knowledge
of the ideal types or abstract formulas that regulate nature? Spinoza’s third
principle is to state the answer in the affirmative, this statement being also
1 Ratio igitur seu causa, cur Deus seu natura agit et cur existit, una eademque est. ...
Aeternum namque illud et infinitum ens, quod Deum seu naturam appellamus, eadem, qua ex-
istit necessitate agit. ... Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet et eandem involvit. ...
atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcumque naturam intelligendi,
nempe per leges et regulas naturae universales.
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an affirmation of God’s love. From ancient times to medieval Jewish philos-
ophy and kabalistic exegesis, this affirmative principle of God’s love has been
associated to a rich imagery based on Genesis 28:12:
!;וְֹבּ Mי£דרֹיו Mִלֹע Mיִה·לֱא יֵכֲאְלַמ ה¦נִהו הָמיָמµשַׁה ַעי¢גַּמ וֹשׁא¸רו הָצרַא בָצuמ Mָלuס ה¦נִהו M·לֲח®י®ו
He [Jacob] had a dream, a ladder was set on the earth with its top reaching
to heaven; and behold, the angels of God were ascending and descending
on it.
Abraham Abulafia, in his book Light of the Intellect (1285), !לֶכ¬שַׂה רוֹא, Or
ha-Sekhel, analyzes Maimonides philosophy in general and this third epistemo-
logical principle in particular, and reiterates the nature of the ascending and
descending movements at Jacob’s ladder, namely, this (e)motion is love! Love
of Divine insight, ahabah elohut sikhlut, !תוּלÇ¤שׂ תוּה·לֱא הַבַהַא, meeting the love of
human understanding, ahabah enoshut sikhlut, !תוּלÇ¤שׂ תוּשׁוֹנֱא הַבַהַא.
Furthermore, in his book Life of the Soul (1275), !שֶׁפªנַה י¦יַח רֶפֵס, sepher chayei
hanephesh, Abulafia compares the joy of this Divine and human intellectual
encounter at Jacob’s ladder to the delight, tha ( anug, !גוּנֲעַתּ, of the groom and
the bride, ha-chathan ve-ha-kalah, !הָלַכּהו Nַתַּחה.
Abulafia’s romantic analogy conceals sylleptic arguments typical of Jewish
medieval philosophy and mysticism, see Stern (2017). On one hand, the verb
!Nֵתוֹח, chothen, (to) marry, also carries the meanings of (to) circumcise and (to)
join, connect. On the other hand, the word for bride, !הָלַכּ, also means – to
be completed, that is related to the roots !לֹכ, all, whole; !לַלָכּ, (to) complete,
perfect, generalize; and !לָלְכּ general rule, principle or law.2
More detailed discussion of the topics presented in this subsection can be
found in Fraenkel (2006), Harvey (2007) and Idel (2000). These articles give
very erudite views of these topics, commenting several aspects beyond the scope
of the present paper. For example, some of these articles show how to rephrase
philological and sylleptic arguments into gematrical calculations, a recourse
typical of medieval kabalah.
2.3 Renouncing the Bride: Werther and Mephisto
After studying in depth the philosophy of Spinoza and its precursors, K.Pearson
begins to depart from its core principles, finally arriving at his “Inverted-
2 Gesenius (1906, p.368, 477-483) and Klein (1987, p.237, 276-278) offer etymological
analyses based on classical methods of comparative linguistics. Clark (1999, p.118-119 p.293-
301), Gesenius (1910, p.99-102), Frajzyngier (1979) and Horowitz (1993) suggest possible
derivations based on formation pathways from biliteral bases to triliteral roots, or from a
geminate root to its gradational variants.
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Spinozism – a Spinozism modified by Fichte”. As he so honestly acknowl-
edges, these modifications take him so far away from Spinoza that their philoso-
phies become, in many aspects, antithetic; hence the name Inverted-Spinozism.
More technical aspects of this philosophical position are analyzed in Section 3,
see also Jacobi (1994, p.502), Limnatis (2008, p.119-120) and Schelling (1994,
p.107-108). In this section we pay close attention to The New Werther narra-
tive.
My reading of The New Werther tells a tale of a groom, Arthur – repre-
senting K.Pearson, that rejects his bride. In this reading, Raphael becomes a
spokesman for the philosopher Baruch Spinoza, while Ethel, Arthur’s beloved
bride, becomes a representation of Greek Sophia (σoφια, wisdom) or Hebrew
Shekinah (from the root !Nכשׁ shochen, to dwell within – meaning Divine under-
standing as it can and does dwell within a human being), that is often sym-
bolically represented in the kabalistic literature as the ‘cosmic bride’. That is,
Ethel becomes a representation of human profound understanding or intuitive
insight that can be achieved by God’s grace. In his scientific and philosoph-
ical papers, K.Pearson rejects the possibility of this kind of understanding,
whereas, in The New Werther, Arthur rejects the love of Ethel, doing so in the
most dramatic way and with the most tragic consequences.
The extent to which K.Pearson accepts “Inverted Spinozism” and, there-
fore, breaks away from the love of Ethel-Sophia, with all its philosophical and
spiritual consequences, becomes clearer as we read The New Werther according
to my proposed interpretation. The following key passages, that I for conve-
nience have labeled (i) to (vii), provide stepping stones for reading The New
Werther according to this interpretation.
In the first quotation, (i), Arthur presents his reasons for staying away from
his (formerly) beloved Ethel. His motives still have an exploratory or tentative
character, but his arguments will mature as the novel progresses, strengthening
the determination of his decisions, and also the gravity of its consequences.
(i) Let us show that the two great schools of materialism and idealism,
which have divided the world against itself, are really at one; that the
inexorable laws under which science asserts that the universe must for
ever roll on, are not empiric, but deducible from the pure reason; and that,
though the sway of the intellect shall thus be extended from the logical to
the empirical, yet that the intellectual, the manly, shall itself be so bound
up with feeling, the womanly, that the two shall be united in one being and
in one life, as we have been. Let us prove that the Ideal is not a world
invented by the painter and the poet, but that it exists in every Actual; that
the Deity is not a cause outside and separate from material man; that the
cause must not be sought outside, but rather in the effect – nay, perhaps,
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is that effect itself. With this end, best of friends [Ethel, Sophia], have
we renounced each other. (NW, p.11).
The next set of quotations, labeled (ii) to (v), give key snapshots of this
novel climax, turning points and anti-climax. In the next scene of interest,
he Germans are celebrating Walpurgisnacht, also known as Hexennacht – the
night of the witches. At this ancient Germanic pagan festival, celebrated
around bonfires at the hilltops, Arthur has a cathartic moment. At (ii), Arthur
(K.Pearson) tries to convince Raphael (Spinoza) to turn his philosophy upside-
down, to replace the absolute God by an absolute Ego – an Ego that is capable
of ripping the veil from the face of nature. Raphael’s answers (iii) with sar-
castic questions: How could a mere mortal take command of the universe?
How could a finite human being acquire infinite knowledge? How could such a
claim be something more than arrogant hubris? Arthur is incapable of answer-
ing the unanswerable, but promises to seek justification for his position within
the theoretical framework of German Idealism. As an indication of Pearson’s
commitment to German culture it is interesting to mention that, during his
trip to Germany, he replaced his English given name by its German version
– from Carl to Karl. Finally, at (v), Arthur expresses a feeling of guilt, as if
he had done something terribly wrong: His heart senses he betrayed the love
of Ethel (Sophia), and anticipates the dangers that lay ahead; Nevertheless,
his mind is already committed to follow the way of departure, renouncing his
promised bride.
(ii) Do you not feel, said I [Arthur, to Raphael], on a night like this, a
titanic fire burning in your soul; that Nature is for the moment, your slave;
that the Spirit of the Universe is at hand, and that you can compel it to
raise its veil?
(iii) Raphael: But how can you, who believe in the pantheism of Spinoza,
allow that the part can possibly compel the whole; that man, an infinites-
imal portion of the Godhead, can command the Spirit of the Universe?
(NW, p.25-26).
(iv) I [Arthur] have determined to read those German reasoners, and then
again to discuss the matter with Raphael [Spinoza]. (NW, p.28).
(v) The morning was cool, yet my head felt on fire. It seemed to me as
if someone had told me I had wronged you, Ethel [Sophia]; and I knew it
was not true. (NW, p.29).
A few pages later, Arthur presents the core of his philosophy in a concise
and well articulated form. The similarities with Fichte’s philosophical position
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and the influence of the Inverted-Spinozism metaphor, as defined by Jacobi
and expanded by Schelling, are fully acknowledged.
(vi) The spirit, to be an “I”, must have a nature of its own; a nature
denotes constancy; constancy we term a law. The I, in order to exist,
must follow this law; the permanency of forms which this law gives to
our perceptions we term space and time. The thought-law which dictates
permanency to the perceptions, compels us to look upon space and time as
infinite and eternal. Thus we see how Eternity and Infinity, which stood
before as twin giants, laughing at and ready at once to crush and obliterate
the feeble actions of a finite humanity, are but the necessary creations of
our own inner nature. Pearson (NW, p.39).
Nothing good will come from following the advice of Locki, the trickster,
no light will be found at the end of a path set by the father of Hell. Arthur is
no longer interested in Rafael’s friendship, and suggests that Raphael makes
a visit to Ethel, who lives in Paris, the city of light (and love). For the next
months, Arthur wanders trough the black forest in an individuation journey of
sorts, that he makes having as sole companion his loyal dog, Gaspar, see Franz
(1990, p.137; 2000, p.59).
Emerging from the forest, he goes to Paris, only to find Ethel (Sophia)
and Raphael (Spinoza) deeply in love with each other. Arthur has an enraged
tantrum, and after an outburst of jealousy and a melodramatic speech of false
forgiveness, commits suicide. At the last pages of The New Werther, its fic-
tional author, Locki, assumes the narrative, for poor Arthur is no longer in
condition to fulfill this role. The very last words of The New Werther bring
Locki’s concluding message (vii), that he delivers pronouncing the words of the
character Mephistopheles in Goethe’s Faust:
(vii) Ich bin der Geist, der stets verneint!
Und das mit Recht; denn alles, was entsteht,
Ist werth, daß es zu Grunde geht;
Drum besser wa¨r’s, daß nichts entstu¨nde.
[I am the spirit that all negates!
And rightly so, for all that originates,
Should rightly to its destruction run;
’Twere better then that nothing were begun.]
3 Inverted Spinozism: Science for the Absolute Ego
In order to fully understand the consequences of the alternative interpretation
of The New Werther presented in the last section, we have to examine the ori-
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gin and interpretations of the expression “Inverted Spinozism”, an expression
coined and used by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) to criticize, and also
describe – in a nutshell, the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814).
The same expression is recycled by K.Pearson to label his own philosophical
position as “Inverted-Spinozism – a Spinozism modified by Fichte”. This ex-
pression appears for the first time in an open letter from Jacobi (1799) to
Fichte from which, in the sequel, we quote some key paragraphs in abridged
form, see Jacobi (1994, p.501-502):
“I am” and “There are things outside me”. Speculative philosophy had
to try to subordinate one of these propositions to the other; to derive the
former from the latter or the latter from the former – exhaustively, in the
end – so that there would be but one being and one truth before its eye, the
all-seeing one! ... Thus the two main avenues, materialism and idealism,
or the attempt to explain everything from a self-determining matter alone
or from a self-determining intelligence, have the same aim. Their opposing
courses do not take them apart at all, but rather bring them gradually
nearer to each other until they finally touch.
Strange, that the thought never occurred to Spinoza of inverting his philo-
sophical cube; of making the upper side, the side of thought which he called
the objective, into the lower, which he called the subjective or formal; and
then of investigating whether his cube still remained the same thing; still
for him the one and only true philosophical shape of reality. Everything
would have transformed itself without fail under his hands at the exper-
iment. The cube that had hitherto been “substance” for him – the one
matter of two entirely different beings – would have disappeared before his
eyes, and in exchange a pure flame would have flared up, burning all by
itself, with no need of place or material to nourish it: Transcendental Ide-
alism! ... I chose this image because I first found entry into the Doctrine
of Science [Wissenschaftslere (1813)] through the representation of an in-
verted Spinozism.
The expression Inverted-Spinozism was further disseminated by Friedrich
Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854), and by several commentators ever
since; In Schelling (1827, 1994, p.108) we find the following extended expla-
nation of why Fichte’s philosophy can be well characterized as an Inverted
Spinozism:
There was no alternative there, if one did not wish to move once again
into the absolute object, witch destroys everything free in the subject, than
to move to the opposite – to the all-destroying subject, which was now no
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longer the empirical subject of Descartes, but only the absolute subject, the
transcendental I. ...
Since this I was not the empirical I, then for Fichte the I am, which he
made into the highest principle of philosophy, could also not be an em-
pirical fact – Fichte declared it to be an action (Thathandlung, literally
‘deed-action’) and showed how the I could in no way exist independently of
this action as a dead, immobile thing, but only in this act of self-positing
[Selbstsetzung] in which he recognized not just a temporal, and also not just
a transitory beginning which had begun the movement at some time, but
the beginning which was always equally eternal – thus that, wherever and
whenever one wanted to begin, this act of self-positing always had to be the
beginning. Fichte’s idealism thus is the complete opposite of Spinozism
or is an inverted Spinozism, because it opposes to Spinoza’s absolute ob-
ject, which destroys everything subjective, the subject in its absoluteness,
opposes the deed [Thathandlung, deed-action] to the merely immobile be-
ing (seyn) of Spinoza; the I is for Fichte, not as it is for Descartes, just
something assumed for the purposes of philosophising, but the real, the
true being, the absolute Prius of everything.
The next sub-sections examine how K.Pearson faithfully and fully accepts
the implications of being a philosopher of Inverse-Spinozism. Sections 4, 5,
and following articles will examine how he carried these positions to his way
of doing science in general and statistics in particular. The next subsections
focus on two specific aspects of great importance, namely, the epistemological
or ontological status of the external world, and the role (or lack thereof) of
causal or metaphysical explanations in the practice of science.
3.1 Human Mind and Reality of “the” External World:
A Contrast with the Constructivism of Paul Volkmann
Pearson restates the same views expressed at the last quotations of The New
Werther using a strictly academic voice, see next quotation.
We require in fact a kind of inverted Spinozism, a Spinozism modified by
Fichte. ... There is no need of the pre-established Harmony ... The outer
world, as we conceive it, is the production of the conceiving ‘Ego’, not
an objective reality enforcing its laws upon the subjective sensitive centre.
When we talk about a law of physical nature, we only mean a necessary law
of thought, any such law is only an intellectual law, the necessary method
in which we are compelled to view our sensations. When we talk of wave
theories, molecular theories, laws of attraction, etc., they are nothing in-
dependent of ourselves but intellectual constructions, necessary to simplify
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the complices of sensation which we call light, heat, planetary motion, etc.
Pearson (1880), Pollock’s Spinoza, p.95.
Jacobi’s metaphor of Inverted Spinozism presents Transcendental Idealism
as – the flaring up of a pure flame, burning all by itself, with no need of place
or material to nourish it. An external cosmos would provide such a place for
the Transcendental Ego’s flame to exist, and natural laws governing material
entities in this cosmos would provide this flame with a base or nourishment.
Nowadays, many didactic texts in statistics present K.Pearson philosophical
positions as a form of mild subjectivism, a subjectivism that, on one hand,
opposes naive or dogmatic forms of realism but, on the other hand, still allows
the scientist to (in some form) relate to the external reality or to connect
to existing objects in the world-out-there. In other words, a subjectivism
that allows the scientist to establish some form of harmony between the laws
governing the way objects “are” in the field of study of his science, a realm
that stands by itself, and the rules of thought used to think about the same
objects. This is absolutely not the position taken by K.Pearson, as it could
be deduced from either Fichte’s definition or Schelling’s explanation of the
expression Inverse Spinozism.
Further explanations concerning the error of seeking some harmony be-
tween rules of though and laws of nature, or between internal representations
and external order, can be found in Pearson (1897), Philosophy of Natural
Science, see following quotations, where K.Pearson criticizes the ideas of Paul
Volkmann concerning this topic. For further details on the physical and epis-
temological ideas of Paul Volkmann, see Corry (2004, p.61-63) and Volkmann
(1896, 1900). Volkmann is not only a scientist, but also a physics’ profes-
sor greatly concerned with good didactic practices. As such, he comes to the
conclusion that teaching physics as an axiomatic system is a bad idea, for it
is neither a faithful depiction of how science is actually built, nor a way of
presentation that favors its understanding. Instead, Volkmann suggests an it-
erative approach as the best option for both understanding and explaining the
role played by the several elements that constitute a scientific theory.
Volkmann presents his epistemological ideas using the metaphor of – The
scientific system as a vaulted arch: As the stones in a vaulted dome, the
elements of a scientific system mutually support each other; as the constructive
pieces of an arched bridge, the elements of a scientific work of architecture are
kept in place by their mutual interaction. This beautiful metaphor is further
explained in Volkmann’s own words in the following quotation:
You can immediately ask for the deeper underlying reason concerning why
there is a need, in the physical sciences, for an iterated cycle of knowledge.
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The reason can easily be seen in the form of emergence and internal opera-
tion of the physical sciences: The conceptual system of physics should not
be understood as a system that is constructed in the manner of a building,
from the bottom-up. Rather, it should be understood as a system of cross-
references that is constructed like a vaulted dome or the arch of a bridge.
In this way, it is a system that demands various mutual and reciprocal
references, in which future results should be known from the start and,
on the other way around, several previously stipulated conditions must be
sustained retrospectively. Physics, in short, is a conceptual system that is
retroactively consolidated.3
Paul Volkmann’s epistemological position is far from any form of na¨ıve or
dogmatic realism. Instead, perhaps way ahead of his time, I would charac-
terize him as a protoconstructivist. Nevertheless, Vokmann is also far away
of K.Pearson’s science of the Absolute Ego. Accordingly, K.Pearson dissects
Volkann’s work, pin-pointing what he considers to be his fundamental mis-
take. This fine critical exercise forces him to express his points of view in
a very clear and candid fashion; this adversarial exercise forces K.Pearson to
make it abundantly clear how far he is willing to walk his path of Inverted-
Spinozism or Transcendental Idealism. Specifically, K.Pearson emphasizes the
epistemological error of conferring an ontological status or simply acknowledg-
ing any thing-in-itself standing alone outside the conceiving Ego, an Ego that
ultimately conceives everything into existence. According to K.Pearson, any
attempt to represent, to connect to, or even to learn from an external order of
things in themselves, leads to a dead end.
We might pass to Dr. Volkmann and show the vagueness of his definitions,
the unphilosophical character of his epistemology, and indicate the danger
which arises when loose analogies drawn from natural science are applied
to other fields of thought. ... For him [Volkmann] natural laws like the
law of gravitation lie outside us while the conclusions of mathematics are
3 Sie ko¨nnen gleich hier nach dem tiefer liegenden Grunde fragen, warum fu¨r die
physikalische Wissenschaft ein wiederholter Kreislauf der Erkenntniss nothwendig ist. Dieser
Grund ist nach Entstehung und Betrieb der physikalischen Wissenschaft einfach darin zu se-
hen, dass das physikalische Begriffssystem nicht etwa aufzufassen ist als ein System, welches
nach Art eines Geba¨udes von unten aufgefu¨hrt wird, sondern als ein durch und durch gegen-
seitiges Bezugssystem, welches nach Art eines Gewo¨lbes oder eines Bru¨ckenbogens aufgefu¨hrt
wird und fordert, dass ebenso die mannigfaltigsten Bezugnahmen auf ku¨nftige Resultate bis
zu einem gewissen Grade von vorneherein vorweg genommen werden mu¨ssen, wie umgekehrt
bei spa¨teren Ausfu¨hrungen die mannigfaltigsten Zuru¨ckverweisungen auf fru¨here Verfu¨gungen
und Festsetzungen statthaben mu¨ssen. Die Physik ist kurz ein Begriffssystem mit ru¨ckwirk-
ender Verfestigung. My translation of Volkmann (1896, 1910, p.113-114), as restated in
Volkmann (1900, p.3-4), see also Volkmann (1896, 1910, p.245) and Corry (2004, p.61-63).
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thought-laws which lie inside us: “Diese Naturnothwendigkeiten ausser uns
nirgends in Widerspruch treten mit den Denknothwendigkeiten in uns.”
[These necessities of nature outside us, nowhere contradict the necessities
of thought in us.]4
This arises apparently from a pre-established harmony the source of which
is accounted for in a manner which the writer tells us is the “Kernpunkt
meiner erkenntnistheoretischen Studien auf naturwissenschaftlichem Bo-
den.” [The core of my epistemological studies concerning the foundations
of natural sciences.]
It [the harmony] lies namely in this: “dass die Logik in uns ihren Ur-
sprung in dem gesetzma¨ssigen Geschehen der Dinge ausser uns hat, dass
die a¨ussere Nothwendigkeit des Naturgeschehens unsere erste und recht
eigentliche Lehrmeisterin ist.” [That the logic in us has its origin in the
regular happenings of things outside us, that the external necessity of the
natural events actually is our genuine and true instructor.] We are only
given this sentence, without one word more description of the process by
which such harmony has been established!
In conclusion, taking Jacobi’s metaphor of Inverted Spinozism in its full
extent, we can understand how K.Pearson reached the conclusion, see The
Grammar of Science (1911, p.109-110), that the science of Transcendental
Idealism can neither be an internal version or representation of external laws,
nor the product of a harmony between internal rules of reasoning and external
laws governing the cosmos. Instead, so-called laws of nature must be the
product of internal harmonizations of distinct aspects or faculties within the
conceiving Ego. That is, according to K.Pearson, a scientist should recognize
that the laws of science result from...
...the harmony between his perceptive and reasoning faculties... Thus both
the material and the laws of science are inherent in ourselves rather than
in an outside world. Our groups of perceptions form for us reality, and the
results of our reasoning on these perceptions and the conceptions deduced
from them form our only genuine knowledge.
3.2 Phenomenological Science vs. Causal Theories
If it is an error to seek for “laws of nature”, even if such laws are derived
from a pre-existent or constructed harmony between rules of thought and rules
governing objects of an external order, then it must be an even greater mistake
to ask for causal explanations, that is, to seek valid answers to questions asking
4 Pearson (1896) gives only the German text; my translations are added in square brackets.
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why “things” behave the way they do (according to a given law of nature).
The next quotation, from Pearson (1901, The Prostitution of Science, p.50),
further analyzes the absurdity of any metaphysical quest, that is, the nonsense
of searching for such causal explanations.
To argue from the harmony existing among my sensations to a like har-
mony and order in the Dinge an sich [things-in-themselves] is to multiply
needlessly the causes of natural phenomena... If the human perceptive fac-
ulty is capable of so co-ordinating sensations that all the groups maintain
their own sequence, and are in perfect harmony with each other, shortly
that ‘order’ and ‘design’ appear in natural phenomena, what advantage do
we gain by needlessly multiplying causes and throwing back the ‘order’ and
harmony of our sensations upon the Dinge an sich, and an unknowable
intellectuial faculty behind them?
In a very condescending manner, K.Pearson speaks to the addicted to meta-
physics, the seekers of causal explanations, trying to save them from wandering
their erroneous path:
In all these cases we are dealing with the sequences of various types of mo-
tion, into which we analyze or reduce a variety of sense-impressions. Just
as in the special case of gravitation, we can also describe these sequences
and can frequently give a measure to the motions which we conceive to
take place, but we are still wholly unable to state why these motions occur.
We may talk, if we please, about the forces [and causes, and parameters]
... but in using such phrases we do not introduce an iota of new knowl-
edge, but too often a whole alphabet of obscurity. We hide the fact that
all knowledge is concise description, all cause is routine. Pearson (1911,
Ch.IV Cause and Effect - Probability, p.133).
Of course, many sensible scientists and philosophers were not so easily con-
vinced to abandon the mission of explaining and understanding laws of nature,
for they knew full well how important causal reasoning can be in the process of
applying these laws to real problems in their fields of expertise, in conceiving
new scientific hypotheses or theories, in implementing new experiments or re-
search projects, etc. Lord Arthur James Balfour (1894, 1902) was among those
totally unconvinced by K.Pearson’s anti-metaphysical arguments. K.Pearson
(1897) answers to lord Balfour are very illuminating. Once more, the adver-
sarial style used in this disputation makes it clear how committed he is in
following his path of Inverted-Spinozism.
Mr. Balfour speaks contemptuously of those who regard the Universe as
a “mere collection of hypostatised sense-perceptions packed side by side in
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space and following each other with blind uniformity in time.” He wants
“ideas of wider sweep and richer content”, and considers that the work
of Science would be beneath contempt if it only provided a machinery by
which the re-occurrence of feelings and ideas might be adequately accounted
for. Pearson (ChD, p.195).
It does not matter whether it be Spinoza with his Infinite Substance, or
Kant with his Dinge-an-sich, or the naturalist with his molecule, or the
theologian with his personal God – one and all can tell us nothing of the
real mode of action of his idolum specus. Pearson (ChD, p.193).
The physicist, who projects his concepts into the unknowable beyond
sense-impression, is as unphilosophical and as dogmatic as the metaphysi-
cian or theologian. Pearson (ChD, p.202).
If the product of scientific research shall never be projected outside the
conceiving Ego, if science can not go beyond accommodations between distinct
properties of the perceiving, reasoning and conceiving Ego, what shall be the
purpose of science? According to K.Pearson, the purpose of science is purely
descriptive. This descriptive function encompasses past and future observa-
tions, that is, this role of description includes prediction, and this must be the
sole motivation of scientific research. This point is made unequivocally clear
in K.Pearson essay answering Balfour objections:
...how is Science related to the phenomenal world? Simply as provid-
ing comprehensive descriptive formula – so-called laws – summed up in a
conceptual model which more or less completely figures past and rehearses
future experience. The symbols of Science are not “things in themselves,”
nor are they perceptions – nay, as a rule, they do not even stand as equiv-
alents for concrete and actual phenomena. Pearson (ChD, p.203).
[T]he mission of Science is not to explain but to describe; to discover a
descriptive formula which will enable men to predict the nature of future
perceptions; such descriptive formulae are, in the only consistent sense of
the word, knowledge, they form that “economy of thought”, which is the
name happily devised by a philosophical physicist to describe and define
Science. Pearson (ChD, p.200).
This last conclusion can be taken as the net result of K.Pearson’s approach
to philosophy of science. The role played by descriptive/ predictive formulas
in science offers, on one hand, a touchstone for validation criteria and, on the
other hand, avoids any metaphysical involvements and complications. This is
K.Pearson’s key to open the realm of epistemology. K.Pearson’s motivations
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in the philosophy of Spinoza and Fichte are today almost forgotten. Never-
theless, the descriptive/ predictive approach to scientific hypotheses gained
wide acceptance, being developed over the first four decades of the XX century
into the philosophical basis for the Frequentist school of statistics. In latter
years, K.Pearson himself gave little emphasis to his early undertakings in Tran-
scendental Idealism. Instead, he concentrated his efforts to advance the more
pragmatical thesis of description/ prediction as the ultimate goal of scientific
hypotheses, and to construct (Frequentist) Statistics as a language designed
as a tool commissioned to best achieve this goal. The last quotation of this
section, stated and restated by K.Pearson in his last years, is typical of this
pragmatic approach:
The Laws of Nature are only constructs of our minds; none of them can
be asserted to be true or to be false, they are good in so far as they give
good fits to our observations of Nature, and are liable to be replaced by a
better ‘fit’... Pearson (1935) as quoted in Inman (1994, p.6).
For K.Pearson, Goodness-of-fit, and nothing else, becomes the ultimate cri-
terion of good science, a criterion that motivates and directs the development
of Frequentist statistics. In contrast, according to K.Pearson, causal reasoning,
laws of nature and their explanation, and similar efforts for metaphysical un-
derstanding have no legitimate role to play in the development of contemporary
science, see Section 4 for further comments.
3.3 Auguste Comte’s Positivism and Logical-Positivism
Auguste Comte (1798-1857) had a multifaceted life and personality, and so
is his philosophical work and legacy, see Lacerda (2009), Manuel (1962) and
Scharff (1995). As mentioned in the introduction, nowadays many text-books
in statistics present K.Pearson’s philosophy as akin to Positivism. K.Pearson’s
own opinion was quite different: On one hand, he gave Comte the merit of
indicating the vanity of causal reasoning but, on the other hand, he contended
Comte was never able to completely break away from metaphysical forms of
thinking. In K.Pearson’s candid evaluation of the historical influence and im-
portance of Comte’s philosophical ideas:
...the writings of Comte have at the very least acted as a stimulus – if only
of the irritant kind – Pearson (1911; The Grammar of Science, p.570).
As in previous sections, I use K.Pearson’s adversarial arguments to high-
light and clarify his full commitment to his Inverted-Spinozism. For K.Pearson,
Comte relapses into metaphysics in (at least) two crucial occasions, namely,
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(a) the Religion of Humanity ; and (b) the Scala Intellectus schema for classi-
fication of scientific disciplines.
(a) The Religion of Humanity is an enterprise of Comte’s late life, only
marginally successful in Comte’s native France and some other countries. To-
day the Religion of Humanity has in Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre, Brasil,
its last working temples, see Lins (1967) and Valentin (2010). Comte’s reli-
gious enterprise got him in trouble with many of his own followers, and was
disregarded without further consideration by later versions of Positivism, in-
cluding the prestigious Logical Positivism movement of the Wiener Kreis. For
K.Pearson, the Religion of Humanity was not only incompatible with his anti-
metaphysical principles, but also did not sit well with his moral and political
ideals.
– we act morally, that is, socially. Positivism has recognised in a vague
impracticable fashion this, the only possible basis of a rational morality;
it places the progress of mankind in the centre of its creed, and venerates
a personified Humanity. Pearson (1901; The Moral Basis of Socialism,
p.303).
(b) K.Pearson’s objections to Comte’s Scala Intellectus or staircase of the
intellect schema for classification of scientific disciplines is far more important
for the purposes of this paper. In this schema, reminiscent of the Jacob’s
Ladder studied in Stern (2017), scientific disciplines are ranked according to
a progressive order of complexity of their fields of interest, each being indis-
pensable for the study of the next one in ascending order. Specific disciplines
are ranked at a seven-step-ladder, starting from mathematics and progressing
to astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, and ethics. According to
Pearson (1892, 1911; The Grammar of Science, The Classification of Sciences,
p.592):
From Comte [we learn] that there is in reality an interdependence in the
sciences, so that a clear understanding of one may necessitate a previous
study of several others.
For K.Pearson, this “interdependence in the sciences” must be unaccept-
able, for it implicitly opens the door for causality relations, even if in concealed
forms or in indirect ways, between the objects of study of the distinct disci-
plines, following the very same links according to which these disciplines are
hierarchically chained into a great chain of being. Furthermore, only getting
rid of Comte’s artificial hierarchy, can K.Pearson allow and justify crafting of
good-fitting descriptive formulae for phenomena of interest of a given disci-
pline to be a task that can and should be accomplished without recourse to
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concepts of lower ranking disciplines in the same hierarchy. Therefore, it is easy
to understand his conclusion stated in Pearson (1892, 1911; The Grammar of
Science, The Classification of Sciences, p.570):
It is clear that we have in Comte’s staircase of the intellect [scala intellec-
tus] a purely fanciful scheme, which, like the rest of his System of Positive
Polity, is worthless from the standpoint of modern science.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, as it should be expected, also in the
topic at hand (concerning causal chains of being) we find K.Pearson’s Inverted-
Spinozism standing diametrically opposed to the philosophy of Spinoza. This
contrast is made clear in Pearson (1901, Ethics of Renunciation, p.84):
In his [Spinoza] system, God, we have seen, is identified with the reality
of things, not things regarded as phenomena, but as links in an infinite
chain of intellectual causality. He is the λoγoς which dwells in and is all
existence; ‘laws of nature’ are only the sensuous expression of the laws of
the divine intellect; the story of the world is only the phenomenalising of
the successive steps in the logic of pure thought.
This and previous sections’ main goal was to understand key aspects of
K.Pearson’s philosophical studies, starting from Spinoza and his medieval pre-
cursors, and ending at a Fichtean type of Inverted-Spinozism. Furthermore,
some consequences of K.Pearson’s particular version of Inverted-Spinozism
have been highlighted by comparison and contrast with views and ideas of
other thinkers, like Friedrich Jacobi, Friedrich von Schelling, Paul Volkmann
and Auguste Comte.
4 From Philosophy to Statistical inference
and the Purging of Causal Agencies
This section gives a brief overview of K.Pearson work in science, from the
time of his spiritual crisis and its subsequent philosophical solution to the end
of his life. K.Pearson’s work in science and philosophy proper lost nowadays
most of its prestige and influence. Nevertheless, this section is intended as a
bridge, providing historical and logical links for the next section, dedicated to
K.Pearson subsequent work in developing the methods and language of classical
or frequentist statistics. Nowadays, statistical science provides the standard
accepted tools for hypothesis testing and validation, providing in this sense a
pragmatic logic for scientific inference. Therefore, it is important to analyze
and understand how the language of classical statistics continues to propagate
K.Pearson’s epistemological ideas, even if some of its underlying philosophical
principles are now discredited, outdated or just forgotten.
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4.1 Ether Physics and Anti-Atomism
In a series of papers from 1884 to 1891, K.Pearson develops some research
topics in the area of Ether Physics. Today this area of research is all but
forgotten, being only of historical interest, see Schaffner (1972) and Whittaker
(1953). However, during the XIX century, Ether or Aether physics was an
important field of study, and a main battle ground between the proponents of
atomic or molecular theories and their antagonists. One of the main goals of
Ether physics was to replace physical theories explained by effects caused by
hypothetical atomic or molecular entities by purely phenomenological models
based on the hydrodynamic or elastic properties of an imponderable medium
called Ether.
K.Pearson sees the Atom as an archetypical agent of causality. For exam-
ple, at physics intra-murus, atoms are agents of causality linking the realm
of classical mechanics to that of thermodynamics, the causal link itself being
explained and understood via the tools of statistical physics. Extra-murus,
atoms and molecules are agents of causality linking the discipline of physics
to that of chemistry, justifying a link in the great chain of being of Auguste
Comte’s hierarchical schema of Scala Intellectus. Therefore, K.Pearson’s mo-
tivations and commitment to the development of Ether Physics are easy to
understand. Notice that although modern statistical physics was developed in
the XX century, atomic models explaining thermodynamic effects are as old as
Robert Boyle’s (1627-1691) volume-temperature law of gases, see Brush (1983),
Needham (2004), Newman (1996, 2006) and Rosenfeld (1953).
Unfortunately for K.Pearson, the whole subject of Ether Physics was at
that time already loosing prestige, until it came to an abrupt end in the Annus
mirabilis of 1905, the year of Albert Einstein’s papers in Annalen der Physik
concerning Special Relativity, the photoelectric effect and Brownian motion.
The autopsy of Ether physics reveals two causes for its sudden death: On one
hand, Einstein’s papers on Special Relativity replace Galileo’s transformations
by Lorentz transformations as the fundamental invariance group of physical
theory, see Stern (2011) and references therein. This elegant substitution solves
and explains with astonishing simplicity a host of problems that the Ether
physics program was for many decades unsuccessfully trying to circumvent
using always more complex and cumbersome phenomenological models. On the
other hand, Einstein’s papers concerning the photoelectric effect and Brownian
motion, with the support of subsequent experimental work by Jean Perrin
(1908, 1911) and Robert Millikan (1914, 1916), gave sufficient reasons for the
overwhelming majority of the scientific community to abandon Ether models
in favor of atomic or molecular theories, for further details and references see
Stern (2014, 2017).
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4.2 Heredity: Mendelian Genetics vs. Statistical Biometry
In the early twentieth century, the Grammar was understood by many,
including by Pearson himself, as a philosophical rationale for statistics,
though in fact he took up statistics only after completing its first edition
[1892]. Thereafter, right to the end of his life, Pearson would make it his
mission to reshape science using the tools of statistical mathematics. From
1893 to about 1905 he published a series of papers that gave a new direction
to the field of statistics. In 1901 he founded, in collaboration with Francis
Galton and W.F.R. Weldon, the journal Biometrika, which was dedicated
to this project. Porter (2004, p7,8)
The short quotation opening this subsection describes the chronology of
a transition period of K.Person’s career. On one hand, his The Grammar of
Science became a resounding success. Far from the romantic and mystical
style of The New Werther, and avoiding the most peculiar eccentricities of
Transcendental Idealism, this book was written to present his epistemological
ideas to the working scientist. On the other hand, the scientific research project
he had chosen to show-case his philosophy, Ether physics, was a complete
failure. Therefore, at this point in time, K.Pearson desperately needed a new
research project that could be used to demonstrate the usefulness of his ideas,
and could also provide a refuge for himself as a working scientist.
K.Pearson was able to find a safe harbor in the fields of biometry, heredity
and evolution biology. In 1891 he starts to collaborate with the zoologist Walter
Frank Raphael Weldon (1860-1906), who soon introduces him to Francis Galton
(1822-1911) – from then on K.Pearson’s great protector, benefactor and role
model in life. A common interest of these scientists was to study the inheritance
of measurable characteristics in biological populations. How to best approach
this problem was at that time a matter of great controversy, concerning the
existence (or not) and the role played by “genes” – (hypothetical) corpuscula
carrying elementary units of genetic information and/or causing the inheritance
of specific characteristics.
On one hand, the role played by genes in biology is, from an epistemological
point of view, quite similar to the role played by atoms in physics or molecules
in chemistry. On the other hand, the chronologies of acceptance of the “molec-
ular hypothesis” in physics and chemistry, and the “genetic hypothesis” in
biology are quite different. Indirect evidence for the inheritance of discrete
genes controlling specific characteristics of biological organisms was available
since the work of Gregor Johann Mendel (1822-1884). However, Mendel (1865)
work, done in seclusion at a Moravian monastery, was completely forgotten un-
til his hypotheses postulating discrete genetic coding units were rediscovered
by Hugo de Vries (1901, 1903). Even so, the nature of these (at that time
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hypothetical) genetic units and their coding mechanisms remained unknown,
eluding successive generations of chemists and biologists until J.D. Watson and
F.H. Crick (1953) cracked the puzzle of DNA’s double-helix structure, see also
Maddox (2003) and Fuller (2003).
Galton’s initial working hypotheses assume the existence of gemmules –
genetic corpuscula transmitting hereditary traits. In order to support this
field of research, Galton develops key concepts and modeling techniques at the
core of modern mathematical statistics, including the definition of correlation
coefficients and linear regression models. For historical accounts, see Cowan
(1972), Fancher (1989), Gorroochurn (2016a,b) and Kevles (1985). Galton
developed these techniques in order to study the simplest non-deterministic
connections between cause and effect, namely, connections that are normally
distributed, linear and unidirectional. For his satisfaction, Galton ascertains
that such linear models produce a very good fit to his populational data banks.
Nevertheless, for his great surprise, Galton finds the same linear models to be
applicable either forwards or backwards in time, contradicting his concepts of
temporal unidirectionality for cause and effect. Galton also realizes that, both
conceptually and mathematically, such a system could be conceived as driven
entirely by a Gaussian stochastic process, with no need to an additional force
or agency causing the system to drift into a preset direction. Consequently,
Galton felt the need for a paradigm shift – abandoning genetic causal theories
in favor of non-causal and phenomenological statistical models for biological
heredity.
It is at this juncture that Galton and K.Pearson start their work together.
Each man had gone trough a crisis of his own, from which they emerged ready
to make the same sacrifice: Renouncing the bride. After a conceptual crisis,
both men were committed to build up a science that is purely descriptive-
predictive in nature and strictly non-metaphysical, with no place for causal
entities or explanations.
K.Pearson was a talented mathematician and, when the time came, he was
ready to help Galton and make progress in the development of mathematical
statistics. K.Pearson was also a skilful (and sometimes ruthless) administrator
of human resources. In time, he would regiment many bright minds to work
for the cause (no pun intended), always running a tight ship and keeping a
steady course in pursuit of his and Galton’s basic programmatic goals. The
next quotation, from 1896, presents K.Pearson’s pledge of allegiance to join
forces with Galton. The main objective of following articles will be to show
how the Frequentist school of mathematical statistics developed its means and
methods so that they were tailor made to perfectly suit the aforementioned
programmatic goals.
242 Julio Michael Stern
A considerable portion of the present memoir will be devoted to the ex-
pansion and fuller development of Mr. Galton’s ideas, particularly their
application to the problem of bi-parental inheritance. ... The causes in
any individual case of inheritance are far too complex to admit of exact
treatment; and up to the present the classification of the circumstances
under which greater or less degrees of correlation between special groups of
parents and offspring may be expected has made but little progress. This is
largely owing to a certain prevalence of almost metaphysical speculation as
to the causes of heredity, which has usurped the place of that careful col-
lection and elaborate experiment by which alone sufficient data might have
been accumulated, with a view to ultimately narrowing and specializing the
circumstances under which correlation was measured. We must proceed
from inheritance in the mass to inheritance in narrower and narrower
classes, rather than attempt to build up general rules on the observation of
individual instances. Shortly, we must proceed by the method of statistics,
rather than by the consideration of typical cases. Person (1896, p.255).
MCTE
4.3 Eugenics: Scientific & Individual Utility, Racial Control
One of the traditional goals and most exalted accomplishments of science is to
give mankind understanding about the world, to provide deep insights on how
it works, or some intuition on why it is the way it is. Not for K.Pearson: His
conception of science is strictly phenomenological, its only goal being accurate
description and prediction of sense-impressions. But if not for wisdom and
understanding, what is science worth?
I am afraid I am a scientific heretic – an outcast from the true orthodox
faith – I do not believe in science for its own sake. I believe only in
science for man’s sake. ... The first condition for State support is that we
[anthropologists] show our science to be utile by turning to the problems
of racial efficiency, of race-psychology, and to all those tasks that Galton
described as the first duty of a nation – ‘in short, to make every individual
efficient both through Nature and by Nurture.’ K.Pearson (1920, pp.136,
148)
Pearson’s conception of science is utilitarian to the core. In the case of his
scientific programs in biometry and heredity, the intended use was eugenics:
The term National Eugenics is here defined as the study of the agencies
under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of
future generations either physically or mentally. K.Pearson (1930, p.222).
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The eugenics project reveals a secondary motivation for K.Pearson, Galton
and the biometics school dislike of heredity theories based on hidden causal
entities, like genes. In such theories, the manifested characteristics of an indi-
vidual, its phenotype, are derived from its genotype, expressed through com-
plex non-linear interactions of multiple genes, in a process that may be further
coupled with epigenetic factors. In the context of a genetic theory of heredity,
a responsible manipulation of population genetics would require deep under-
standing of highly complex genomic networks – also taking into account the
ecological effects of genetic diversity and many other aspects far beyond XX
century science, for further comments, see Kevles (1985, p.145). Galton and
K.Pearson’s approach dismissed the aforementioned obstacles using the follow-
ing hyper-simplified definition of heredity.
Heredity: Given any organ in a parent and the same or any other organ
in its offspring, the mathematical measure of heredity is the correlation
of these organs for pairs of parent and offspring. The word organ here
must be taken to include any characteristic which can be quantitatively
measured. If tile organs are not those of parent and offspring, but of any
two individuals with a given degree of blood relationship, the correlation of
the two organs will still be the proper measure of the strength of heredity
for the given degree of relationship. Pearson (1896b p.259).
K.Pearson’s strictly phenomenological and uninhibitedly utilitarian view
of science may have been one of the contributing factors that lead him to
pledge his support to most unscrupulous political projects, like in the following
quotation from a speech from 1934 delivered at University College, London.
Pearson died two years later, in 1936. Had he lived a few years longer, he
may have recognized in this political project the hand of Mephistopheles – the
scatterer and forgerer of lies – the fictional author of The New Werther, the
book of romantic dreams of his youth.
The Royal Society Council having passed a resolution that mathematics
and biology should not be mixed, Biometrika was founded with Galton as
consultant and Weldon and myself as joint editors. Buccaneer expeditions
in too many fields followed; fights took place on many seas, but whether we
had right or wrong, whether we lost or won, we did produce some effect.
The climax culminated in Galton’s preaching of Eugenics and his founda-
tion of the Eugenics Professorship. Did I say ‘culmination’? No, that lies
rather in the future, perhaps with Reichskanzler Hitler and his proposals to
regenerate the German people. In Germany a vast experiment is in hand,
and some of you may live to see its results. If it fails it will not be for want
of enthusiasm, but rather because the Germans are only just starting the
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study of mathematical statistics in the modern sense! K.Pearson (1934,
p.23), also quoted in Senn (2003, p.144, 238).
5 Inverted-Spinozism Lives!
The Language of Classical Statistics
The main objective of this section is to indicate how K.Pearson’s philosophy
ultimately engenders the epistemological foundations of classical or frequentist
statistics (XX century mainstream school), strongly influences the evolution of
the theoretical framework of statistical science in general (directly for the fre-
quentist school, and indirectly for the Bayesian school), and imposes implicit
guide-lines for the development of well-conforming operational methods and
models. Moreover, the language and dialects developed by these statistical
schools were specifically designed to facilitate the acceptance of K.Pearson’s
philosophical principles in the practice of science, and to induce “epistemolog-
ically correct” forms of expression and communication in scientific research.
Although many of K.Pearson’s philosophical and scientific ideas are now
considered obsolete or discredited, the language of classical statistics, crafted
by him and his co-workers, not only survives but thrives up to the present days.
Since the second half of the XX century, statistical significance measures (fol-
lowing the nomenclature of frequentist statistics) became the accepted standard
by which scientific hypotheses must be judged. Therefore, we can understand
how K.Pearson’s philosophy ultimately spreads its influence far and wide, even
if rigorous philosophical principles got diluted along the way, hence exerting
their influence in subtle, sometimes almost subliminal forms. Indeed, on one
hand, mainstream contemporary statistics clearly upholds the descriptive/ pre-
dictive and non-explanatory nature of statistical models in particular and of
science in general while, on the other hand, downplays the historical origins and
epistemological foundations of the same philosophy, rooted in K.Pearson’s ver-
sion of Inverted-Spinozism. In the language of statistics, K.Pearson’s Inverted-
Spinozism is translated as deprecation of inverse-probabilities, as explained in
the following paragraphs.
Statistical models distinguish two classes of variables, namely: On one
hand, there are variables in the sample-space. These variables are associated
with observable phenomena, quantities of interest to which we assign direct
probabilities. On the other hand, there are variables in the parameter-space.
These variables are associated with latent or non-observable quantities that
often correspond to hidden causes of the observed phenomena. The most basic
learning mechanism in statistical models, Bayes rule, is a formula used to
update inverse probabilities according to newly available observations.
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Bayes rule was first described in the article An Essay towards solving a
problem in the Doctrine of Chances, published at The Philosophical Transac-
tions of the Royal Society in 1763. In this article, the ideas of the Presbyterian
minister Rev. Thomas Bayes (1701-1761) were communicated posthumously
by Rev. Richard Price (1723-1791), nominated by Bayes as his literary execu-
tor. The motivations for Bayes work are clearly stated in his work, see next
quotation. At the time, the expression inverse-probability was not yet in use,
instead, since parameters often stand for hidden causes for observed phenom-
ena, the expression probabilities of causes was commonly used, see Fienberg
(2006).
The purpose, is to shew [show] what reason we have for believing that
there are in the constitution of things, fixed laws according to which events
happen, and that, therefore, the frame of the world must be the effect of
the wisdom and power of an intelligent cause; and thus to confirm the
argument taken from final causes for the existence of the Deity [...and...]
it will be easy to see that the problem solved in this essay is more directly
applicable to this purpose; for it shews [shows] us, with distinctness and
precision, in every case of any particular order or recurrency of events,
what reason there is to think that such recurrency or order is derived from
stable causes or regulations in nature, and not from any of the irregularities
of chance. Bayes (1763), as quoted in Barker (2001, p.84).
Reading Bayes explanations, as presented by Price, is seems that their
research perfectly conforms to the Spinozian program of cognitione causae et
leges naturae universales. In subsequent generations, probabilists like Pierre-
Simon de Laplace (1749-1827) and George Boole (1815-1864) champion the
efforts for modeling causal relations and computing probabilities of possible
causes, developing the mathematical techniques needed to build and formally
present the first workable statistical models. As explained in Sections 2, 3 and
4, this course of development was turned around by the work of K.Pearson.
Methodologically, the frequentist school can be characterized by allowing
the use of direct probability statements, that is, by considering observables
as random variables, while strictly forbidding inverse probability statements,
that is, by never considering random variables in the parameter-space. The Fre-
quentist school’s deprecation of inverse-probabilities is a 180◦ turn, a complete
reversal of a long-standing tradition in the history of probability and statis-
tics, for inverse probability methods had been developed by leading figures of
preceding generations, like Bayes, Laplace and Boole.
The most powerful weapon K.Pearson developed for fighting his anti-metaphysical
war was a new language, the language of the frequentist school (nowadays also
knows as the classic school) of mathematical statistics. In this development
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effort, K.Pearson had to fight in internal and external fronts. Externally, he
had to promote “classical” statistics as the language of choice for the analysis
and validation of scientific research. Internally, he had to battle heresies inside
the statistical community, and assure the crafting of a language that is con-
ducive of orthodox thinking, expressing arguments that are, by construction,
free of metaphysical contamination. These battles are the primary focus of
forthcoming articles, as further explained in the next section.
6 Final Comments and Further Research
In this section present some final comments, propose some additional topics
for further research, and give due acknowledgments.
Spinoza, Bayes, Price, Comte, Boole and K.Pearson, all allowed their reli-
gious believes to inspire their philosophical or epistemological principles that,
in turn, directly motivated their scientific work and ideas. The study of his-
torical interfaces and influences between science and religion seems to have
gone out of fashion, with scientists and academic philosophers and theologians
often in accordance about the necessity to separate their domains of study,
an isolation effort intended to protect each specialty from possible harmful
interference. The topics discussed in the present article and in Stern (2017)
make me seriously doubt the viability and validity of artificially imposing such
hermetic seals. Further research in the following topics should help to clarity
this position.
6.1 Statistical Languages and Philosophical Commitments
Following articles will show how K.Pearson an his coworkers cast the language
of mathematical statistics in order to enforce the tacit acceptance and practical
use of his philosophical and epistemological ideas. Several key choices in the
construction of modern statistics can not be explained solely by logical prop-
erties and mathematical requirements. Instead, these key choices can only
be understood as reflecting epistemological principles based on K.Pearson’s
inverted-spinozism, even if at the expense of developing a formalism with fewer
or weaker functionalities and inconsistent logical properties, see Borges and
Stern (2007), Esteves et al. (2016), Madruga (2001), Pereira et al. (2008),
Stern (2017, 2018), Stern and Pereira (2014), and Stern et al. (2017). More-
over, following articles will show how K.Pearson managed to be very successful
in his campaign, using the language of frequentist statistics to promote and
consolidate the acceptance not only of his statistical methodologies, but also
of his underlying (but far less advertized) philosophical principles.
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6.2 Frequentist Epistemology and Logical Positivism
Later versions of the Positivist movement, known as Logical Positivism, Em-
pirical Positivism or Logical Empiricism, were developed under the influence
of the Wiener Kreis from 1907 to 1938, and subsequently around the world.
These neopositivist programs abandon the goal of becoming all encompassing
systems of philosophy, taken instead a more pragmatic approach, concentrat-
ing their efforts into specific epistemological questions and the development of
mathematical logic as a tool to support their research program.
Rudolf Carnap (1932) stated as a main goal of the neopositivist program
to be – The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language.
Meanwhile, K.Pearson and his school were developing Frequentist statistics as
a tool for building up a science free of metaphysics. This is a far more ambitious
and radical proposal since statistics, as conceived by K.Pearson, is not a tool
designed to analyze science as it is and circumvent its metaphysical problems,
but a tool designed for actually making scientific research in such a way that
science becomes, by construction, free of metaphysics.
I have the impression that the two approaches, based on their respective
supporting languages, namely, mathematical logic and mathematical statistics,
had the potential of greatly benefiting from each other. However, the interac-
tion between researchers of the two groups and their mutual influence seems to
have been rather small. Nevertheless, in the second part of the XX century, sci-
ence practitioners and writers of didactic textbooks have often confused ideas
coming from neopositivism and Frequentist statistics, carelessly overlapping
topics that would require more careful treatment. I believe that confirming
these first impressions and trying to understand these parallel courses of his-
torical development are topics that deserve future research.
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